Reconnaissance & footprinting
Learn what public-facing assets and DNS records can reveal. In this lab, the inventory is synthetic and already isolated.
Eight fictional incidents. Four learning perspectives. A controlled terminal, evidence you can correlate, and decisions that teach the why behind the response.
Original educational material inspired by common security practice. RR CyberLabs is independent and does not provide or imply official CEH certification.
Learn what public-facing assets and DNS records can reveal. In this lab, the inventory is synthetic and already isolated.
Interpret fictional service and identity observations. Understand that a finding is a lead to validate, not proof of access.
Review a deliberately vulnerable demo application's evidence, rank risk, and suggest remediation before any exploit is attempted.
Correlate synthetic DNS, authentication, process-tree and network telemetry. Scope carefully, contain proportionately, then recover.
Continue learning: DNS investigation · MITRE ATT&CK foundations · Incident response · SOC learning path
Move between network building, endpoint behavior, incident hunting, and a guided red-versus-blue range.
Run a mission command to reveal simulated activity.
Start by reviewing the mission objective and available commands.
Education only. Simulated commands operate on a fixed set of fictional evidence. They cannot execute shell commands, scan networks, attack real systems, or connect to external targets. MITRE ATT&CK references are candidate learning mappings and require evidence validation.
These short learning notes explain why the latest fictional cases were added. They summarize public defensive research; they are not attribution claims or proof that a particular technique was used in a case.
Recent incident research describes social engineering around authentication resets and device-code flows, followed by unauthorized authentication-method changes, cloud discovery, and SaaS data access. In the lab, correlate the user report, method-change audit, device, and follow-on API events. A successful sign-in alone does not establish legitimacy or compromise.
Microsoft Security Research: passkey-themed social engineering (September 2026) · Microsoft Security Research: device-code phishing (April 2026)
Dependency drift, compromised developer tools, altered pipeline configuration, and mismatched build provenance are useful blue-team scenarios because defenders can compare lockfiles, reviewer records, runner identity, signatures, and downstream artifact use. The lab never installs packages or runs build code.
Google Threat Intelligence: hardening code pipelines and CI/CD (September 2026) · Google Threat Intelligence: software supply-chain mitigation (July 2026)
Investigate token and app activity through ownership, permission scope, source context, API volume, and audit trails. A forwarding rule, consent grant, or object read is an indicator to validate; it does not prove that information left the organization.
Google Threat Intelligence: defending SaaS against social engineering and data theft (January 2026)
Sources reviewed October 2026. Scenarios use fictional identities, .test names, documentation-range addresses, and fixed browser data. No external activity is performed.
Use the fictional alerts, endpoint events and network evidence from this lab to practice describing a risk, choosing a safeguard, assigning an owner and recording evidence. SIEM, NDR and EDR signals help explain what happened; GRC makes the response measurable and accountable.